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Abstract: The main objective of this study is to compare ownership structure of different levels of 
collapse in listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). Study variables are the ownership structure 
that includes governmental ownership, private ownership (corporate ownership and individual 
ownership) and the different levels of collapse including latency stage, the stage of cash deficits and 
commercial and financial insolvency and complete collapse. Altman model (Z´- Score) is used to predict 
the collapse of firm and Chi-Square test is used to test the research hypothesis. The study is the applied 
research and statistical population of study includes 96 collapse firms that are active in the TSE (subject 
to Business Law Article 141). Given the availability of financial information of distressed companies in 7 
years between 2004-2010 years, a sample of 81 members was selected. The results show that the 
ownership structure of collapsed firms is independent from their different levels of collapse. 
 
Key words: Ownership structure, collapse firms and Tehran Stock Exchange.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent big collapses all over the world and its implications on macro-economy world and the pressures 
have put on the accountants respecting their contributions on the financial crisis require that accounting 
scholars to be aware of their role in social events like bankruptcy. There is a question for accountants as 
to why accounting numbers are so doubtful. If accounting is to serve as economy facilitator why it is failed 
predicts recent crisis. Here is the case to all researchers to develop our filed by conducting the studies 
related to this world.  Regarding this, in our contribution, we try to unfold one of these aspects. Financial 
decision-making is one of the most important subjects of financial management. The aim of providing 
financial and accounting information is to establish a base for economic and financial decision-making. All 
decision-makings need information which leads to selecting an efficient and effective resolution. Optimal 
and economic resolution selection requires compiling data, processing, and analyzing and logical 
inferences form information, which is called financial analysis in financial management literature. 
Analysis of financial statements helps shareholder and creditors in measuring whether as to firms are 
improving financially or in the future it will face constraint and bankruptcy (Rahnamaee et al, 2006). 
 
One of the ways that helps in optimal utilizing of investment and better assignment of resources is 
predicting impending financial distress or bankruptcy. As such, firstly with providing necessary warnings 
it makes firm aware of impending financial distress to respect these warnings, necessary actions are 
taken. Secondly, investors and creditors can distinguish between favorable and unfavorable investment 
opportunities and invest their resources in favorable investment. On the other hand, nowadays there is a 
separation between ownership and control. By gradually decreasing direct governance of owners on 
firms, control is delegated to other groups such as board of directors and managers. Therefore, it is 
expected that every changes in ownership structure lead to changes in their strategic and performance 
and also increasing or decreasing agency cost (Mazloumi, 2005). Many researches have investigated the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm's performance and profitability. Considering that 
weak and improper performance and firm's consequent loss making may drive in financial distress, 
decision makers and investors should pay attention to firm's ownership structure in order to avoid from 
investment in firms with ownership structure likely to be financially distressed in order to mitigate risk. 
However, respecting to aforementioned issues, in this study the ownership structure at different level of 
financial distress in listed firms of TSE is explored. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The subject of separation between ownership and management and its effect on organizations 
performance has been a matter of scrutiny for authors and researchers of organizational, industrial 
economic, financial and recently strategic management theories. In this regard, the top levels of 
organizational hierarchy, ownership structure (diversity and the level of ownership distribution), and 
effective procedures of management and corporate governance are the matters of researchers interest. 
Threshold to study this matter is to classify the types of ownership and control which is done in various 
way (Mazloumi, 2005). Nowadays there is a separation between ownership and control. By gradually 
decreasing direct governance of owners on firms, control is delegated to other groups such as board of 
directors and managers. Because of interrelationships and hierarchy between these groups, there rises an 
interaction between them which has two sides. First side is power interaction between them and the 
linkage methods of elements comprising this set which is called corporate governance. And this has 
implications on the firm's orientation and performance. Second side is that this interaction is established 
in the legal structure called corporation that using it burdens costs that called agency costs (Ibid). 
Considering aforementioned matters, it is expected that every changes in ownership structure leads to 
changes in the route of firm strategic and performance and also increasing or decreasing agency cost 
(Ibid). 
 
On the other hand, recent financial distress of large international firms has caused that the matter of 
financial distress become an important issue in financial management. Bankruptcy is an objective 
subjects that firms struggle with, and because of its prevailing, it is also dominant matter in financial and 
investment literature as “ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure”. Exploring the roots of 
distress through the prevailing models is important. In fact, bankruptcy is the end of an entity activity. In 
this regard, understanding the roots of bankruptcy by financial management is dominant because firm's 
investors and managers are willing to be aware of bankruptcy to manage to prevent from it. Financial 
mangers may not recognize the bankruptcy signals to prevent firm from it unless they know the reasons 
that caused it (Rahnamaee et al., 2006). In economic view, financial distress can interpret as firm's loss 
making in which state firm is unsuccessful. In fact, in this state, firm`s return rate is less than cost of 
capital rate. Another form of financial distress is occurred when a firm fails to comply one or more 
articles of the debt contract such as holding current or equity to total assets ratio according to the 
contract which is called technical failure. Other states of failure are when firm's cash flows are insufficient 
for paying principal and interest of debt and also when the number of firms equity is negative (Raee & 
Falahpour, 2008). 
 
Fich & Slezak (2007) investigated as to whether corporate governance saves distressed firms from 
bankruptcy. Their findings indicate that a distressed firm’s governance characteristics significantly affect 
its probability of bankruptcy. They also found that smaller and more independent boards with a higher 
ratio of non-inside directors and with larger ownership stakes of inside directors are more effective at 
avoiding bankruptcy once distress is indicated. Their results were consistent with the belief that these 
types of governance structures induce more effective monitoring and also with the view that the inclusion 
of governance characteristics enhances the power of financial accounting models in predicting 
bankruptcy. Nahar (2006) examined the influence of board independence; CEO duality and ownership 
structure on the firm financial distressed status using a sample of distressed companies and a matched-
pair sample of non-distressed companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia. He came to the end that board 
independence and CEO duality are not associated with financial distressed status and management and 
non-executive directors’ interests are associated negatively with financial distress. He also documented a 
negative association for outside block holders. His evidence supports the contention that ownership by 
non-executive directors and outside block holders effectively increases their incentives to monitor 
management in ensuring their wealth in the firms is intact. Fan et al. (2009) explored regarding how 
institutional factors influence behavior of distressed firms. They discovered that institutional background 
matters considerably to distress resolution and distressed companies facing better institutional 
background (i.e. with less state ownership structure, in regions with better government quality and 
greater degree of local financial development), display relatively better operating performance, more 
disciplined capital structure, and higher ultimate recovery likelihood.  
 
Chang (2009) examined about which corporate governance characteristics are correlated with financial 
distress by a sample of Taiwanese listed firms. He tested his Hypotheses by combining outside directors, 
CEO duality, and equity ownership by insiders, female directors, board size, multiple directorships, and 
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director tenure. His results from logistic regression analysis show that board independence: boards with 
larger percentage of outside directors are less likely to fall into financial distress than boards with a lesser 
percentage. He also indicated that there is a positive correlation between board size and financial 
distress. Parker et al. (2002) investigated association of various corporate governance attributes and 
financial characteristics with the survival likelihood of distresses firms. Their results show that firms that 
replaced their CFO with an outsider were more than twice as likely to experience bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, they showed that larger level of block holders and insider ownership are positively 
associated with the likelihood of the firm survival. Charitou et al (2007) examined the earnings behavior 
of managers during the distressed period by looking at sources of abnormal accruals prior to the 
bankruptcy-filing year. Their results show that managers of highly distressed firms shift earnings 
downwards prior to the bankruptcy filing. They provided evidence in support of two potential 
contributing factors. First, top-level management turnover among distressed firm’s leads new managers 
to earnings bath choices during the distressed period. Second, qualified audit opinions exert pressure on 
managers to follow more conservative earnings behavior during the distressed period. Their evidence is 
also provided that the management of distressed firms with lower (higher) institutional ownership has 
greater (lesser) tendency to manage earnings downwards. In addition, they highlighted that higher 
institutional ownership mitigates the negative abnormal returns of firms with top management turnover.  
 
Elloumi & Gueyie (2001) studied the relationships between corporate governance characteristics and 
financial distress status. They conclude that the board of director's composition explains financial 
distress, beyond an exclusive reliance on financial indicators. They indicated that outside directors' 
ownership and directorship affect the likelihood of financial distress. Tarraf (2011) find that aggressive 
risk taking, a corporate governance aspect, was a major cause of the 2007-2008 financial crises. He 
identifies three elements – improper incentive system, rationalization and opportunity – that encouraged 
managers in financial institutions to engage in aggressive risk taking. According to Business Law Article 
142, if half of firm's equity eradicates because of incurred losses, board of directors must hold 
extraordinary general meeting immediately to decide on the firm`s going concern. If the meeting decides 
on existence, the firm equity must drop into the existence amount of equity. 
 
Causes of Bankruptcy: It is not so easy to determine the causes of bankruptcy or financial distress 
precisely. Bankruptcy stems from several reasons together in so many cases. However, according to Dan 
and Bradstreet main causes of bankruptcy are financial and economic problems. Classifies the bankruptcy 
causes into two groups of internal and external organizational causes. According to external causes are 
(Rahnamaee et al., 2006): Economic system features, competition, changes in business and improvements 
and transitions in public demand, business validity, financing and incidents. According to Nyoton internal 
causes are which ones that can be prevented by firm's action. Most of these factors result from wrong 
decision-makings and its responsibility directed to firms. These factors are: extending excess credit, 
inefficient management, insufficient equity, conspiracy and fraud.  
 
Bankruptcy Stages: classifies firm's unfavorable financial position into latency stage, the stage of cash 
deficits and commercial and financial insolvency and ultimately complete collapse. Although  most of 
bankruptcies follow these stages, some of firms may bankrupt at once (Hajiha, 2005). With respect to 
mentioned theories and considering that the most of valid researches which state significant relationship 
between ownership structure, firm's performance and profitability, the relationship between ownership 
structure and financial distress is expected; however, we will try to answer the question that if firms 
ownership consists of different groups, which one of these combinations is significant at different level of 
firm`s financial distress. Although many researches have been conducted regarding ownership structure 
and its effect on performance, profitability and firm's value in worldwide, these researches are limited to 
the relationship between ownership structure, firm's performance and profitability. Taking into account 
that weak and improper performance and firm's continuous loss making can lead to financial distress, the 
relationship between ownership structure and financial distress is expected. By reviewing the databases 
and available resources it is found that there is no study regarding the subject of this research and most of 
these researches have studied ownership structure and financial distress with other variables 
independently. Below represents some of these researches: Despite many researches, there are no 
consensus about the relationship between ownership structure and its effect on firm's performance. 
Some researches show positive relationship between ownership structure and firm's performance and 
some others non-monotonous relationship. 
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Corporate governance literature shows that equity and ownership structure affects firm's value, however, 
theories, on its own, can not predict this relationship explicitly and empirical results are inconsistent too 
(Margaritis & Sillaki, 2009). Minguez et al. (2007) in a research titled “Does ownership structure affect 
value?” found a positive effect of ownership by main stock holders on firms value in the Spanish market 
which is not significant and regard ownership structure effects as a internal control mechanism in the 
capital market. They also argue that there may not be a systematic relationship between ownership 
structure and firm`s value.   According to the results, considering main stockholders control, there is 
strong possibility of positive relationship between ownership and firms value (Minguez et al., 2007). 
Muhammadi and AlibafAsl (2009) investigated the concurrent and distinct role and effects of 
concentration and ownership structure on both firms return and value in TES. Their sample consists of 70 
firms during the period of 2002 to 2007. Their findings show a liner and significant positive between 
concentration and firm's value. On the other hand, findings of ownership structure effect indicate, 
contrary to the negative relationship between stock return and governmental ownership ratio, there is a 
positive and significant relationship between individual, institutional, and private ownership and return. 
In addition, the results of investigating the relationship between ownership structure and firms value 
highlighted the same results. ShahSahebi (2000) studied the effect of influence, control and governmental 
and non-governmental ownership on firms return during the period of 1995-1999. Their results suggest 
that governmental ownership percentage is a neutral factor on governmental firms return. In other 
words, firms return does not change merely because of ownership transmission from government to non-
government; rather firms return increasing needs a long term planning, control and monitoring on the 
dispossessed firm.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
This study is the applied research considering that the objective of this study is to help potential and 
present investors regarding optimal decision making in investing in corporations and accurate evaluation 
of financial statements items of investee. Moreover, it is descriptive study considering that it is aimed to 
compare ownership structure and financial distress in TSE. Research population consists of 96 firms of 
TSE informal window during the period of 2004-2010 that delisted according to Business Law Article 
141. The sample is selected considering following conditions: 
 
 Financial information especially notes of financial statements must be available for bankruptcy 
related calculations during the sample period. 
 Sample firms must not be financial, investment institutions and banks.  
 Documental and field methods are used to collect the data. The documental method is used for 
literature review and conceptual formwork (e.g. books, articles, theses, etc.). In the filed method, 
using TSE database and statistical technique, the relationship between ownership structure and 
financial distress in TSE is investigated and extended to the population of TSE. 
 
Data analysis tool: After collecting the data, SPSS software is used to analyze it as following: 
 
 Descriptive statistic: first the data is illustrated through descriptive statistic methods such as 
frequency tables, central parameters (mean, median, and mode) and dispersion parameters 
(variation, standard variation, etc.). 
 Inferential statistic: considering that the measurement scale of research is nominal and ordinal, 
the Chi-Square test is used. 
 
Research hypothesis: This research has one main hypothesis as following: 
Distressed firms ownership structure is independent from the levels of financial distress. 
 
Research Variables: The study variables are ownership structure at four sector of governmental and 
private (institutional and individual) and financial distress at three levels of latency stage, the stage of 
cash deficits and commercial and financial insolvency and complete collapse. We define each of variables 
as following (Muhammadi and AlibafAsl, 2009): Firm with governmental ownership: a firm that more 
than 50 percent of its stock belongs to government and or other governmental firms and sectors.   Firm 
with institutional ownership: a firm that its biggest owner is a non-governmental legal entity. Firm with 
individual ownership: a firm that its biggest owner is individual entity.  Firm with private ownership: a 
firm that its biggest owner is a non-governmental legal entity or individual entity (institutional ownership 
and individual ownership). 
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Latency stage: In this stage firms may struggle with one or more unfavorable situation in conceal 
without immediately traceability such as demand declining.  Economic losses often occur in this stage and 
assets return drops. The best disposition for firm is to discover the problem in this stage because easy 
resolutions those are effective in this stage will not work in next stages. In addition, if the problem is not 
solved in this stage, the public reliance will decrease. 
 
Cash deficit: this position occurs when for first time a firm does not access cash to fulfill commitments 
(Rahnamaee et al., 2006). 
 
Financial insolvency: in this stage, the firm has the ability to access to enough cash through 
consumptions channels and management has the ability of recognizing and solving the problem.  
 
Complete insolvency: in this stage, total firm's debt is more than total assets and firm can not avoid from 
bankruptcy. Altman Z-Score Multiple Discrimination Analysis (MDA) is applied to financial distress 
likelihood prediction of sample firms, classifying them into four stages of latency, Cash deficit, 
commercial, and complete insolvency. The underlying reasons of selecting the Altman Z-Score are usage 
of Newton classification concerning firm's financial distress in the one hand and closeness of Nowton 
definitions of financial distress and Altman classification concerning the firm's financial distress 
likelihood on the other hand. In other words, none of the bankruptcy models is not be able to classify the 
financial distress into three level of very low, low and very high likelihood. Altman Z-Score is as following 
(RahnamaeeRoudposhti et al., 2006):  
 
Z´= 0.717x1+ 0.847x2+ 3.107x3+ 0.42x4 + 0.998x5   
x1= working capital to total assets 
x2= retained income to total assets 
x3= earning before interest tax  
x4= book value of equity to book value of debt 
x5 = total sale to total assets 
The obtained number is described as following: 
When Z´< 1/33, the possibility of bankruptcy is high, 
Z´< 2/9, firm is in bankruptcy reign, When 1/33 
When Z´> 2/9, the possibility of bankruptcy is low; 
 
To analyze the data and to test the hypothesis using Chi-Square test, the relationship between two 
qualitative variables of ownership structure and financial distress levels is investigated. 
 
4. Results 
 
Descriptive Findings: In descriptive methods, the objective is to illustrate the research data through 
descriptive statistic tools such as central and dispersion parameters in order to make transparent the 
study subject. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistic of governmental firms 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Statistic 
46 45 45 46 51 56 56 observations 
-4.989 2.725 -1.860- -1.866 0.120 0.758 1.484 mean 
-0.143 0.217 0.475 0.723 1.542 1.559 1.697 median 
-94.898 -65.467 -49.114 -48.830 -22.300 -13.192 -2.270 mode 
96.898 69.085 51.994 51.348 25.474 17.417 6.954 range 
1.617 1.503 8.544 9.108 4.039 2.877 1.519 Standard diviation 
261.496 121.719 72.999 82.962 16.315 8.276 2.307 variation 
4.390 -4.762 -4.503 -4.016 -3.787 -3.018 -0.539 -skewness 
21.950 25.138 22.527 17.527 19.086 11.506 0.498 kurtisis 
94.766 -65.467 -49.114 -48.830 -22.300 -13.192 -2.270 -min 
2.133 3.618 2.880 2.518 3.174 4.224 4.680 max 
229.483 --122.607 83.702 --85.847 6.114 42.472 83.114 Sum 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistic of private firms 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Statistic 
35 36 36 35 30 25 25 observations 
-1.080 0.372 -0.121- 0.575 1.009 1.257 0.992 mean 
-0.046 0.149 0.654 1.000 0.937 1.287 1.310 median 
-9.988 -7.490 -5.793 -3.680 -0.226 -4.032 -9.600 mode 
12.853 11.224 9.113 7.578 9.794 9.148 15.758 range 
2.993 2.277 2.188 1.659 1.887 1.886 2.766 Standard diviation 
8.956 5.186 4.789 2.751 3.561 3.556 7.652 variation 
1.394 -1.159 -1.184 -0.550 -0.205 -0.420 -2.356 -skewness 
1.373 1.764 0.952 0.287 2.335 2.268 9.148 kurtisis 
9.988 -7.490 -5.793 -3.680 -4.208 -4.032 -9.600 -min 
2.865 3.754 3.320 3.898 5.586 5.116 6.158 max 
37.804 --13.392 4.352 -20.111 30.255 31.427 24.802 sum 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistic of all firms (governmental and private firms) 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Statistic 
81 81 81 81 81 81 81 observations 
3.29 1.67 -1.08- -0.81 0.44 0.912 1.33 Mean 
-0.13 0.16 0.55 0.77 1.25 1.48 1.59 median 
-94.76 -65.46 49.11 -48.83 0.22 -13.19 -9.6 Mode 
97.63 69.22 52.43 52..72 27.88 18.308 15.7 Range 
1.24 8.40 6.55 7.02 3.41 2.60 1.98 S.  diviation 
154.69 70.59 43.00 49.31 11.67 6.81 3.93 variation 
5.71 -6.16 -5.70 -5.25 -4.15 --2.88 2.18 -skewness 
38.19 43.62 38.01 31.28 24.70 12.36 11.06 kurtisis 
94.76 -65.46 -49.11 -48.83 --22.3 -13.19 9.60 -Min 
2.86 3.75 3.32 3.89 5.58 5.11 6.15 Max 
267.28 --135.99 -88.05 65.73 -36.36 73.89 107.91 Sum 
 
The research hypothesis is examined during 7 years from 2004 to 2010 for each year separately. The null 
and alternative hypotheses are provided as following: 
 
Null hypothesis: ownership structure of distressed firms is independent of the level of financial distress.  
Alternative hypothesis: ownership structure of distressed firms depends on the level of financial distress. 
The results of main hypothesis testing are summarized in table 3. 
 
Considering the changes in firm's ownership structure during the study period, Chi-Square test is applied 
for each year separately. As it is shown in Table 4, taking the significance level (more than 5 percent) into 
account the null hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, two variables of ownership structure and the level of 
financial distress are independent. In other words, there is not difference between ownership structure 
and financial distress level. 
 
Table 4: Chi-Square test results 
Year  sig Sig  H0 
2004 0.05 0.468   Sig accepted 
2005 0.05 0.843   Sig accepted 
2006 0.05 0.181   Sig accepted 
2007 0.05 0.106   Sig accepted 
2008 0.05 0.151   Sig accepted 
2009 0.05 0.86   Sig accepted 
2010 0.05 0.544   Sig accepted 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Research main hypothesis is investigated during the period of 2001-2007 for each year separately. The 
results show that ownership structure and level of financial distress are independent. In fact, different 
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level of financial distress can not be explained by ownership structure. Regarding that the study is in the 
corporate governance world and it is not well-established in Iran (because this requires to complete 
denationalization and separation of management and ownership). However, ownership structure is in 
question in Iran because ownership structure is private in appearance while in fact it is governmental. 
Therefore, distinguishing firm's ownership structure is not possible. 
 
Based on study, it is suggested to TSE and other related organizations such as auditing to classify and 
determine the level of financial distress and report the result to investors and other stockholders. 
 
 Since the lion's share of country economy is in governmental sector. However, it is suggested that 
in the future studies the difference between managers behavior of private and governmental 
sector regarding firm's bankruptcy to be investigated. 
 Since using listed firms of TSE endures some limitations for research on bankrupted firms. So 
using unlisted firms can help to improve the obtained results. 
 Considering that the results of testing research hypothesis show independence of different 
ownership structure and financial distress. However, it is suggested that the impact of ownership 
structure on distressed firms to be investigated. 
 Since Altman Z-Score is used in this research to test financial distress and considering the 
difference of preciseness of different methods of testing financial distress, it is suggested that 
other method of testing financial distress to be used in future studies. 
 It is suggested that the research hypothesis to be investigated in different industries and based 
on firms characteristics. 
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